

Message Text

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S E C R E T STATE 032478

NODIS
FOR DR BRZEZINSKI

FOLLOWING REPEAT LUSAKA 364 ACTION SECSTATE INFO CAPE TOWN
DAR ES SALAAM GABORONE LAGOS LILONGWE LONDON MAPUTO PRETORIA
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QUOTE

S E C R E T LUSAKA 0364

EXDIS DISTRIBUTE AS NODIS

USUN FOR AMB YOUNG
CAPETOWN FOR EMBASSY

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PDEV RH UK US
SUBJ: RHODESIA: POSSIBLE INTERNAL AGREEMENT AND POSSIBLE
CONSEQUENCES

REF: (A) STATE 29697, (B) DAR 513

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SUMMARY: KAUNDA IS SKEPTICAL THAT SMITH SERIOUSLY INTENDS TO
TRANSFER POWER BUT IS INCLINED TO BELIEVE MUZOREWA AND SITHOLE
WILL ACCEPT ANYTHING TO GAIN POWER. INTERNAL SETTLEMENT
ANNOUNCEMENT LIKELY TO MEET WITH TOTAL AFRICAN REJECTION
FOLLOWED BY STOCK TAKING AS EVENTS DEVELOP. ZANU AND ZAPU CAN
BE EXPECTED TO INTENSIFY WAR EFFORT TO DISRUPT DEVELOPMENTS
PROJECTED BY AGREEMENT, ESPECIALLY ELECTIONS. THERE IS A RISK
THAT ZAMBIA WILL BE PULLED INTO FULL SUPPORT OF ZAPU'S MILITARY
ZFFORT AND IN SO DOING AGREE TO STRENGTHENED SOVIET AND CUBAN
SUPPORT FOR ZAPU. ZAMBIAN SUPPORT FOR ZAPU COULD GIVE RISE TO

INCREASING UNREST FROM THE ZAMBIAN POPULATION IN LIGHT OF PROBABLE RETALIATION FROM RHODESIA. KAUNDA IS LIKELY TO TRY TO RIDE OUT STORM OF PROTEST BY CALLING FOR ASSISTANCE FROM COMMUNIST COUNTRIES RATHER THAN WITHDRAW SUPPORT FROM NKOMO. IN ADDITION TO THE THREAT OF A COUP FROM THE RIGHT, KAUNDA MIGHT BE THREATENED BY A CUBAN-SOVIET SUPPORTED COUP FROM THE LEFT IF HIS ARDOR FOR THE ARMED STRUGGLE SHOULD COOL. GRZ WOULD EXPECT US TO CONDEMN INTERNAL SETTLEMENT AND SUPPORT ZAMBIA IN STRUGGLE AGAINST NEW REGIME IN SALISBURY. STRAINS ON ZAMBIAN-US RELATIONS ARE LIKELY CONSEQUENCE. USG SHOULD NOT RUSH INTO FIRM STATEMENT IMMEDIATELY ON ANNOUNCEMENT OF INTERNAL SETTLEMENT. EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL PROPOSALS MIGHT BE MATED OR FRONTLINE MIGHT COME UP WITH A NEW INITIATIVE ON ITS OWN. END SUMMARY.

1. WITH MINOR EXCEPTIONS, WE AGREE WITH MOST OF DARQ RESPONSE TO REF STATE TEL. WHAT FOLLOWS AMPLIFIES AND DEVELOPS THAT REPORT AS SEEN FROM LUSAKA.

2. GRZ JUDGMENT ON LIKELIHOOD OF INTERNAL SETTLEMENT. KAUNDA BOTH PRIVATELY AND PUBLICLY HAS EXPRESSED SKEPTICISM THAT SMITH IS IN FACT PREPARED TO TRANSFER POWER (EVEN A SHAM TRANSFER) TO RHODESIAN BLACKS. HE BASES HIS ASSESSMENT ON HIS BITTER EXPERIENCE OF DEALING WITH SMITH OVER THE YEARS. HIS
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GUT FEELING IS THAT SMITH IS UP TO HIS OLD TRICKS OF BUYING TIME, THIS TIME AROUND ON THE CHANCE THAT BY SO DOING HE CAN GET A BETTER DEAL. KAUNDA'S SKEPTICISM OVER AN AGREEMENT ON AN INTERNAL SETTLEMENT IS TEMPERED BY THE REALIZATION THAT SITHOLE AND MUZOREWA MAY SEE THIS AS THEIR LAST CHANCE AT POWER. THEREFORE, THEY MAY BE READY TO ACCEPT HITHERTO UNACCEPTABLE GUARANTEES FOR THE WHITES IN THE INTEREST OF PROMOTING THEIR OWN POLITICAL FUTURES. KAUNDA HAS THE IMMEDIATE EXAMPLE OF PAST ACTIONS OF HIS CLOSEST RHODESIAN FRIEND, NKOMO, TO REMIND HIM HOW MUCH THE NATIONALISTS ARE WILLING TO CONCEDE IN THE INTEREST OF COMING OUT ON TOP IN RHODESIA.

3. HOW EVENTS WOULD UNFOLD. THE INITIAL AFRICAN REACTION TO AN ANNOUNCEMENT OF AN INTERNAL SETTLEMENT IN PRINCIPLE MOST LIKELY WILL BE ALMOST UNANIMOUS REJECTION. THEN THERE WILL FOLLOW A PERIOD OF STOCK TAKING WHILE OUTSIDE OBSERVERS, AFRICANS INCLUDED, TAKE A CLOSER LOOK AT THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE, TIMOZWOLE FOR ELECTIONS, GUARANTEES FOR WHITES, ETC. THOSE MOST IMMEDIATELY CONCERNED WITH ENSURING THAT THE INTERNAL INITIATIVE SHOULD FAIL, ZANU AND ZAPU, CAN BE EXPECTED TO ATTEMPT TO DISRUPT DEVELOPMENTS IN RHODESIA THROUGH INTENSIFIED WARFARE. THESE ATTEMPTS WILL INCREASE IF AND WHEN AFRICANS JOIN SMITH'S GOVERNMENT AND ELECTIONS ARE ORGANIZED IN AN EFFORT TO THWART THEM. ALMOST ALL AFRICAN STATES WILL HESITATE TO RECOGNIZE THE INTERNAL ARRANGEMENTS WHILE SMITH IS ASSOCIATED WITH THEM. ON THE OTHER HAND, IT IS

UNLIKELY THAT MORE DISTANT AFRICAN STATES (LIKE NIGERIA) WILL INCREASE THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE ARMED STRUGGLE AS LONG AS THERE IS AT LEAST THE APPEARANCE THAT A TRANSFER OF POWER TO THE BLACKS IS TAKING PLACE.

4. POSITIONS OF THE GRZ ON INTERNAL SETTLEMENT. NO MATTER HOW CLOSE AN INTERNAL SETTLEMENT MIGHT BE TO THE ANGLO-AMERICAN PROPOSALS, IF IT DOES NOT CLEARLY INCLUDE THE PATRIOTIC FRONT AND SPECIFICALLY NKOMO, INITIAL GRZ REACTION
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WOULD BE TOTAL REJECTION. (THOUGH IF NKOMO WERE TO BE INCORPORATED INTO THE SETTLEMENT, WHICH WE BELIEVE UNLIKELY BUT WHICH WE DO NOT EXCLUDE ALTOGETHER, KAUNDA WOULD QUICKLY MOVE TO RECONCILE HIMSELF WITH IT).

5. WE BELIEVE IT LIKELY THAT KAUNDA WILL BE PULLED INTO FULL SUPPORT FOR ZAPU'S MILITARY STRUGGLE. THIS COULD BE SLOWED AND WEAKENED BY THE EXISTENCE OF A VISIBLE ALTERNATIVE TO AN INTERNAL SETTLEMENT. SUCH AN ALTERNATIVE COULD TAKE THE FORM OF A STRENGTHENED ANGLO-AMERICAN PROPOSAL WITH A FIRM INDICATION OF HOW SMITH IS TO BE REMOVED. EVEN WITH SUCH AN ALTERNATIVE, ZAMBIA COULD BEGIN BY PERMITTING INTENSIFIED INFILTRATION AND ATTACKS FROM ZAMBIAN SOIL--ATTACKS DESIGNED TO DISCREDIT THE INTERNAL SOLUTION. IT COULD END WITH ZAMBIA FULLY COMMITTED TO AN ARMED STRUGGLE INCREASINGLY AIDED AND ABETTED BY THE SOVIETS AND CUBANS.

6. KAUNDA WOULD MAKE HIS COMMITMENT TO SUPPORTING THE ARMED STRUGGLE IN AWARENESS OF SOME OF THE CONSEQUENCES BUT NOT ALL OF THEM. OVER THE YEARS HE HAS SHOWN DEEP CONCERN, BORDERING ON PARANOIA, ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF RHODESIAN ATTACKS, ESPECIALLY BY AIR ON ZAMBIA. HE ALSO HAS BEEN SUSPICIOUS OF SOVIET AND CUBAN INTENTIONS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA AND HAS ATTEMPTED TO LIMIT THEIR SCOPE OF OPERATIONS IN ZAMBIA. IN OPTING FOR SUPPORT OF THE ARMED STRUGGLE, KAUNDA WOULD BE CONSCIOUS OF THE POSSIBILITY THAT HE WOULD BE INVITING WIDER INVOLVEMENT BY THE SOVIETS AND CUBANS. HOWEVER, HE WOULD BE INCLINED TO DISCOUNT THIS DANGER, ARGUING THAT THEIR ACTIVITIES COULD BE LIMITED AND CONTROLLED. IN THE EARLY PERIOD FOLLOWING THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF AN INTERNAL SETTLEMENT, NKOMO COULD BE EXPECTED TO ASK FOR AND BE PERMITTED TO INCREASE THE NUMBER OF SOVIETS
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AND CUBANS WORKING WITH HIS FORCES. KAUNDA WOULD SEE THIS INCREASE AS A SMALL PRICE TO PAY TO MAKE THE LIBERATION OF RHODESIA POSSIBLE. THE REAL DANGER TO HIM WOULD COME LATER.

7. WHEN ZAPU MAKES ITS FIRST LARGE SCALE MILITARY PENETRATION INTO RHODESIA, THE RHODESIAN FORCES CAN BE EXPECTED TO RETALIATE AGAINST THEM WITH A FAIR AMOUNT OF SPILLOVER AGAINST ZAMBIANS, MILITARY AND CIVILIAN. WHEN THEY DO, KAUNDA WILL FIND HIMSELF CONFRONTED BY AN INCREASINGLY HOSTILE POPULATION DISILLUSIONED BY HIS LEADERSHIP WHICH HAS LED ONCE AGAIN TO ZAMBIAN SACRIFICES FOR WHAT WILL APPEAR THIS TIME AS PERSONAL SUPPORT FOR NKOMO. AT THIS POINT HE WILL HAVE TWO OPTIONS: (A) HE COULD ATTEMPT TO RIDE OUT THE STORM OF PROTEST, WHICH MIGHT THREATEN HIS POLITICAL SURVIVAL, BY CALLING FOR INCREASED OUTSIDE SUPPORT. HE WOULD ASK FOR MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE FROM ANY SOURCE, BUT IT IS LIKELY THAT ONLY THE COMMUNIST COUNTRIES WOULD RESPOND TO HIS PLEAS FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE. (B) HE COULD ABANDON HIS COMMITMENT TO NKOMO AND COME TO TERMS WITH WHATEVER GOVERNMENT IS ESTABLISHED IN SALISBURY.

8. WE BELIEVE KAUNDA WOULD CHOOSE OPTION A AND IN SO DOING FIND HIMSELF ISOLATED FROM THE ZAMBIAN PEOPLE IN HIS SUPPORT OF NKOMO AND DEPENDENT ON COMMUNIST SUPPORT TO HOLD ON TO HIS JOB. RETAINING POWER UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES AGAINST AN INCREASINGLY HOSTILE POPULAR DEMAND FOR A SHIFT FROM HIS POLICY WOULD BE A FORMIDABLE TASK. WE BELIEVE THE COMMUNIST COUNTRIES, CUBA AND THE USSR, MIGHT BE WILLING TO MAKE A RELATIVELY LARGE COMMITMENT TO KAUNDA TO KEEP HIM IN POWER IF THIS GUARANTEED A BASE OF OPERATIONS FOR RHODESIAN ARMED STRUGGLE. THESE COMMITMENTS MIGHT EXTEND TO PROTECTING KAUNDA FROM HIS OWN PEOPLE.

9. IF THE INTERNAL OPTION SUCCESSFULLY PROGRESSES THROUGH ITS INTERIM PERIOD AND ELECTIONS, OTHER AFRICAN STATES, INCLUDING SOME OF THOSE FROM THE FRONTLINE, MAY BEGIN
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WAVERING IN THEIR REJECTION OF THE INTERNAL SETTLEMENT. KAUNDA WILL BE UNDER INCREASING PRESSURE TO DO SO AS WELL. HE WOULD DECIDE TO MOVE IN THIS DIRECTION ONLY WITH EXTREME RELUCTANCE.

HOWEVER, SUCH A MOVE COULD BE FORCED UPON KAUNDA BY THOSE WHO HAVE BECOME DISILLUSIONED BY THE SACRIFICES ZAMBIA HAS MADE FOR THE LIBERATION OF RHODESIA. THEY COULD BE EXPECTED TO ARGUE FORCEFULLY THAT, WHILE PREPARED TO MAKE SACRIFICES FOR MAJORITY RULE, THEY ARE NOT PREPARED TO DO SO TO INSTALL NKOMO IN POWER. THIS SENTIMENT MIGHT WELL EXTEND TO THE ZAMBIAN ARMED FORCES WHO CAN BE EXPECTED TO RECOGNIZE THAT CONTINUED SUPPORT FOR NKOMO COULD LEAD THEM INTO CONFLICT WITH RHODESIAN REGULAR FORCES FOR WHICH THEY ARE ILL PREPARED OR EQUIPPED. IF KAUNDA RESISTED THIS PRESSURE, HE COULD WELL BE OVERTHROWN.

10. THERE IS, OF COURSE, THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE CUBANS

AND SOVIETS ONCE ENTRENCHED IN ZAMBIA MIGHT TURN AGAINST KAUNDA. INSTEAD OF PROTECTING HIM FROM A COUP FROM THE RIGHT, SHOULD HE WAIVER IN HIS COMMITMENT TO THE LIBERATION OF ZIMBABWE, THEY MIGHT BACK A COUP FROM THE LEFT.

11. WHAT GRZ WOULD EXPECT FROM THE US. KAUNDA WOULD JUSTIFY HIS COMMITMENT TO ZAPU ON HIGH MORAL GROUNDS AND WOULD EXPECT THE USG TO SHARE HIS CONCEPTION OF WHAT IS MORALITY. HE WOULD DEMAND THAT THE USG FORTHRIGHTLY CONDEMN THE INTERNAL SETTLEMENT. LATER, IF HIS COUNTRY SHOULD SUFFER FROM RHODESIAN INCURSIONS, HE WOULD TAKE HIS CASE TO THE UN REQUESTING SUPPORT FROM THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WITH SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA AND CALL UPON THE US TO SUPPORT HIM ECONOMICALLY AND MILITARILY. IF THE US FAILED TO CONDEMN THE INTERNAL SOLUTION IN STRONG TERMS
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AND REFUSED TO PROVIDE MILITARY ASSISTANCE, HE WOULD TEND NOT TO BLAME PRESIDENT CARTER BUT RATHER THE "US ESTABLISHMENT." THIS HE SEES AS LIMITING THE ABILITY OF PRESIDENT CARTER TO TURN HIS GOOD INTENTIONS INTO EFFECTIVE ACTION. IF, HOWEVER, THE US FAILED TO PROVIDE ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE, KAUNDA WOULD TAKE THIS AS AN INDICATION OF US ABANDONMENT. AS A CONSEQUENCE, SEVERE STRAINS IN US-ZAMBIAN RELATIONS COULD BE EXPECTED.

12. HOW USG SHOULD RESPOND TO INTERNAL SETTLEMENT. AS INDICATED ABOVE, IMPLEMENTATION OF AN ANNOUNCEMENT OF AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE ON AN INTERNAL SETTLEMENT WILL OCCUR OVER A FAIRLY LENGTHY PERIOD. IN OUR VIEW, THE USG SHOULD NOT RUSH IN WITH A FIRM STATEMENT IMMEDIATELY UPON INITIAL ANNOUNCEMENT. WE WOULD WANT TO STUDY THE PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT AND SEE THE REACTIONS OF THE FRONTLINE AND NIGERIA FIRST. THE INITIAL QUESTION FROM THE PRESS CAN BE ANSWERED BY STATING OUR CONTINUED SUPPORT FOR THE ANGLO-AMERICAN PROPOSAL AND REITERATE THE IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO A SOLUTION WHICH COULD END THE WARFARE. WE FIND MUCH IN DAR'S TELEGRAM OF INTEREST IN SUGGESTING FURTHER STEPS WHICH MIGHT BRING THE TWO SIDES AND THE TWO PROPOSALS CLOSER TOGETHER. OF COURSE THE TWO FORMAL PROPOSALS--OURS AND THE ONE FROM SALISBURY-- WOULD NOT BE THE ONLY WAY IN WHICH THE PARTIES COULD BE BROUGHT TO LIGHT WE MIGHT FIND AT THAT TIME THAT THE FRONTLINE COUNTRIES, INCLUDING KAUNDA, WOULD THEMSELVES SEEK TO MOUNT A NEW MEDIATING EFFORT. WE WOULD THEREFORE WANT TO KEEP FROM COMMITTING OURSELVES TOO FIRMLY IN ANY DIRECTION IN THE INITIAL PERIOD.

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